Connection data retention and access in criminal proceedings: the Cour de cassation draws the consequences of the decisions delivered by the CJEU (ruling n° 769 - 21-83.710)

21-83.710 FS-B R

No. 00769

GM

12 JULY 2022

DISMISSAL

Mr SOULARD, President

FRENCH REPUBLIC

ON BEHALF OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE

 

RULING OF THE CRIMINAL CHAMBER OF THE COUR DE CASSATION (COURT OF CASSATION) OF 12 JULY 2022

 

Mr [C] [L] [E] lodged an appeal against the ruling of the investigating chamber of the cour d’appel (Court of Appeal) of Paris, seventh section, dated 27 May 2021, which, in the information against him concerning in particular the charges of murder and attempted murder, destruction of property, by an organised group, and criminal association, ruled on his application for annulment of documents in the proceedings.

By order of 23 September 2021, the President of the criminal chamber ordered the immediate examination of the appeal.

A written submission was filed.

On the report of Ms Ménotti, judge, the observations of SCP Célice, Texidor, Périer, lawyer to Mr [L] [E], and the submissions of Mr Desportes, first advocate-general, the lawyer to the applicant having pleaded last, after discussions in the public hearing of 19 May 2022 attended by Mr Soulard, President; Ms Ménotti, judge-rapporteur; Mr Bonnal, Mr de Larosière de Champfeu, Ms Leprieur, Ms Sudre, Mr Maziau, Ms Issenjou, Mr Turbeaux, Ms Labrousse, Mr Seys, Mr Dary, Ms Thomas, Mr Laurent, judges of the Chamber; Ms Barbé, Mr Violeau, Mr Mallard, Ms Guerrini, Mr Michonjudge referees ; Mr Desportes, first advocate-general; and Mr Maréville, Chamber Registrar,

The criminal chamber of the Cour de cassation (Court of cassation), composed of the above-mentioned President and judges, after having deliberated in accordance with the law, has delivered the present ruling.

Facts and procedure

1. It follows from the ruling under appeal and the documents contained in the file that:

2. Following a shooting that took place on 24 August 2019 in the course of which [D] [P] was killed, the police began the investigation using the powers vested in them when a crime has just been committed (enquête de flagrance).  A criminal investigation under the supervision of an investigating judge (juge d’instruction) was opened on the above-mentioned charges on the following 6 September.

3. Mr [C] [L] [E] was arrested on 23 June 2020, charged on 26 June and placed in pre-trial detention.

4. On 28 December 2020 he filed a petition requesting that some of the evidence against him be suppressed.

 

Reviewing pleas

On the first plea

Statement of plea

5. The plea objects to the ruling under appeal rejecting the petition submitted by Mr [L] [E] for the annulment of documents, in view of the fact “that in a separate submission, referral was requested to the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) of a Priority Constitutional Question on the conformity with rights and freedoms that the Constitution guarantees, and in particular with the right to privacy guaranteed by Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens of 1789 and Article L. 34-1 of the Postal and Electronic Communications Code; and that the repeal of that text, on the basis of which the data regarding Mr [L] [E] was collected, preserved and used, will result in the quashingof the ruling.”

Court’s response

6. While the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council), in its ruling No. 2021-976/977 QPC of 25 February 2022, found certain provisions of Article L. 34-1 of the Postal and Electronic Communications Code to be contrary to the Constitution insofar as they disproportionately restrict the right to privacy, it also ruled that the measures in question may not be contested on the basis of that unconstitutionality.

7. It follows that the plea is moot.

On the second and third pleas

Statement of pleas

8. The second plea objects to the ruling under appeal dismissing the petition submitted by Mr [L] [E] for the suppression of evidence, whereas:

“(1) any court that prosecutes an individual using evidence obtained by means of the precautionary, general and indiscriminate collection and retention of traffic and location data as is incompatible with European Union law is in infringement of Article 15 of Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 as amended, read in the light of Articles 7, 8, and 11, as well as Article 52, paragraph 1, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, specifically because said collection and retention are neither targeted nor subject to the authorisation and oversight of an independent body; whereas in the current case, Mr [L] [E] argued that said data had been retained in a preventive, general and indiscriminate manner, in violation of the above-mentioned texts, in petitioning for the annulment of the traffic and location data required, obtained and used against him; whereas in failing to respond to this operative plea, the investigating chamber infringed Article 593 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;

(2) whereas any court that prosecutes an individual using evidence obtained by means of the precautionary, general and undifferentiated collection and retention of traffic and location data as is incompatible with European Union law is in infringement of Article 15 of Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 as amended, read in the light of Articles 7, 8, and 11, as well as Article 52, paragraph 1, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, specifically because said collection and retention are neither targeted nor subject to the authorisation and oversight of an independent body; whereas in the current case, Mr [L] [E] argued that said data had been retained in a preventive, general and indiscriminate manner, in violation of the above-mentioned texts, in petitioning for the annulment of the traffic and location data required, obtained and used against him; whereas in dismissing this petition by holding that the infringement on Mr [L] [E]’s privacy was proportionate to the desired objective, the investigating chamber was in infringement of Articles 15 of Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 as amended, 7, 8, and 11, as well as Article 52, paragraph 1, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.”

9. The third plea objects to the ruling under appeal dismissing the petition submitted by Mr [L] [E] for the annulment of documents, whereas “any court that prosecutes an individual using evidence obtained by means of the precautionary, general and indiscriminate collection and retention of traffic and location data outside any authorisation or oversight by an independent body violates the right to privacy guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas in the current case, in petitioning for the annulment of the traffic and location data required, obtained and used against him, Mr [L] [E] argued that in violation of the above-mentioned text, that data had been retained in a preventive, general and indiscriminate manner and collected without either prior authorisation or subsequent oversight by an independent body; whereas by holding, in dismissing that petition, that it followed that the infringement on his privacy was disproportionate to the desired objective; whereas by holding, in dismissing the petition, that the intrusion on Mr [L] [E]’s privacy resulting from the collection and use of that data was proportionate to the legitimate aim of prosecution of criminal offences, the investigating chamber infringed the above-mentioned Article 8.”

Court’s response

10. The pleas are joined.

11. In order to ensure the effectiveness of all provisions of EU law, the principle of primacy requires national courts to interpret their national law as far as possible in a manner consistent with EU law. Failing such an interpretation, the national court is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court [L] to request or await the prior setting aside of such provisions by legislative or other constitutional means (CJEU, ruling of 9 March 1978, Simmenthal, 106/77).

12. Therefore, it should be ascertained whether, as of the date of the charges in question, French laws on connection data retention and access were in compliance with EU law.

On the lawfulness of the retention

On European Union requirements with regard to the general and indiscriminate retention of connection data

13. The Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled that it follows from Article 15, paragraph 1 of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52, paragraph 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, that EU law precludes the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data as a preventive measure for the purpose of fighting crime, regardless of the seriousness of that crime. It allows solely for general, indiscriminate retention of such data in the event of a serious threat to national security that is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, via an instruction imposed on providers of electronic communications services that is subject to effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that such a threat exists and that the conditions and safeguards which must be laid down are observed, and where that instruction may be given only for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended if that threat persists.

14. By contrast, EU law does, for the purpose of combating serious crime, provide for:

- the targeted retention of traffic and location data which is limited, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, according to the categories of persons concerned or using a geographical criterion, for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended;

- the general and indiscriminate retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of an Internet connection for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary;

- the general and indiscriminate retention of data related to the civil identity, accounts, and payments of users of electronic communications systems;

- recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services, by means of a decision of the competent authority that is subject to effective judicial review, to undertake, for a specified period of time, the expedited retention of traffic and location data in the possession of those service providers, provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse.

15. The basis of this expedited retention is Article 16 of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime signed in Budapest on 23 November 2001, with Member States having the ability to provide legislatively for access to traffic and location data for purposes of combating serious crime, in order to shed light on a specific offence, subject to compliance with the substantive and procedural conditions provided for in EU law (CJEU, judgment of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and Others, [4] and elsewhere, C-511/18, C-512/18, C-520/18).

16. According to the CJEU, the expedited retention of data and access to that data may involve data stored by providers of electronic communications services on the basis of Articles 5, 6 and 9 of Directive 2002/58/EC or on the basis of legislative measures taken under Article 15, paragraph 1 (CJEU, La Quadrature du Net judgment, supra, points 160 and 167).

17. That position was maintained in the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána judgment of 5 April 2022 (C-140/20, points 85 and 87), in which the Court once again ruled out any general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data for the purpose of combating serious crime, in response to an objection by the Danish government (same judgment, points 96-100).

18. The expedited retention can therefore apply to data that is held by electronic telecommunications operators either for their own needs or by virtue of a retention mandate imposed in order to safeguard national security.

19. Any interpretation in which data retained for the purpose of safeguarding national security is excluded from the scope of application would render this meaningless, since the goal is to give national authorities tasked with combating serious crime access to data that was not retained for that purpose.

20. Moreover, such a measure can be expanded to include traffic and location data relating to persons other than those suspected of having planned or committed a serious criminal offence, so long as that data can, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, shed light on such an offence, such as data concerning the victim and his or her social or professional circle (CJEU, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána judgment, supra, point 88).

On the general and indiscriminate retention of connection data under French law

21. Article L 34-1, III, of the Postal and Electronic Communications Code, in the version in force on the date of the facts, requires that electronic telecommunications services maintain general, indiscriminate retention of the connection data listed in Article R. 10-13 of said code for a maximum period of one year, for the investigation, identification and prosecution of criminal offences.

22. This latter text, in the version in force on the date of the facts, states that this retention requirement of one year applies to:

a) information that can be used to identify the user;

b) data relating to the communications terminal equipment used;

c) the technical characteristics as well as the date, time and duration of each communication;

d) data on additional services requested or used and their providers;

3) data that can be used to identify the recipient(s) of the communication.

23. It also provides that, for telephone operations, the operator must retain data on traffic as well as data that can be used to identify the origin and location of the communication.

On the compliance of French law with EU law with regard to the general and indiscriminate retention of connection data

24. It follows from the principles set out in paragraphs 13 and 14 that the above-mentioned rules set forth under French law should be set aside, insofar as they require general and indiscriminate retention of connection data by electronic telecommunications service providers for the purpose of combating crime, with the exception of civil identity data and account and payment information as well as, in connection with the investigation and prevention of serious crime, IP addresses.

25. By contrast, the obligation by operators to retain traffic and location data, established in Article L. 34-1, III, of the above-mentioned code and implemented by Article R. 10-13 of said code, insofar as it allows for the investigation, identification and prosecution of violations of the fundamental interests of the nation and acts of terrorism, offences described in Articles 410-1 through 422-7 of the Penal Code, is in accordance with EU law, since it is in pursuit of the objective to safeguard national security.

26. The retention period of one year for said data appears strictly necessary for the purposes of safeguarding national security.

27. Furthermore, the provisions of the above-mentioned articles from the Postal and Electronic Communications Code do not require that this retention obligation be subject to periodic review to establish that this serious, genuine and present or foreseeable threat to national security still exists.

28. It follows that this retention obligation is not an injunction in the sense intended by the CJEU and that this retention is not constant unless the presiding judge, under the oversight of the Cour de cassation (Court of cassation), finds that a threat exists with the aforementioned characteristics.

29. In that regard, even taking into account the requirement under EU law that such retention cannot be systematic in nature (CJEU, La Quadrature du Net judgment, supra, point 138), it follows specifically from the documents duly produced by the Prosecutor-General to the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) regarding the attacks committed in France since December 1994, i.e., prior to the date of the facts in this case, that as a result of terrorism and the activities of radical and extremist groups, France is exposed to a serious, genuine and present or foreseeable threat to national security.

30. Therefore, the obligation imposed on electronic telecommunications operators to retain, in a general, indiscriminate manner and for the purpose of safeguarding national security, the connection data indicated in Article R. 10-13 of the above-mentioned code that was the subject of the charges in question, complies with EU law.

31. The Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) has not, moreover, found the provisions of that article to be illegal, insofar as they require electronic communications operators, Internet access providers and hosting services to retain connection data on a general, indiscriminate basis other than civil identity data, IP addresses and account and payment information, for purposes of combating crime and preventing threats to public order, and do not call for a periodic review to establish that a serious, genuine and present or foreseeable threat to national security still exists (CE, 21 April 2021, French Data Network, No. 393099, point 58).

On expedited retention under French law

32. It is then appropriate to examine whether, on the date when the facts occurred, regulations in compliance with EU law were in place allowing for the expedited retention of traffic and location data. In particular, any such regulation must specify the purpose(s) for which expedited retention may be ordered (CJEU, La Quadrature du Net judgment, supra, point 132).

33. On that date, any communication of traffic or location data retained by telecommunication operators could be requisitioned during an investigation into a crime that had just been committed (enquête de flagrance) pursuant to Articles 60-1 and 60-2 of the Criminal Procedure Code, by a police officer; during a preliminary investigation, pursuant to Articles 77-1-1 and 77-1-2 of said code, by authorisation of the public prosecutor; and when an investigation is opened, pursuant to Articles 99-3 and 99-4 of said code, by a police officer authorised by a letters rogatory from the investigating judge. The lawfulness of these operations may be challenged before the investigating chamber or the trial court, under the supervision of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation).

34. These provisions, which stated  the immediate disclosure of connection data to the competent national authorities, must be treated as an injunction for expedited preservation as defined in the Budapest Convention. The explanatory report to the Budapest Convention stipulates that the expedited preservation injunction may result from a production order.

35. In addition, pursuant to the sixth paragraph of Section III of the preliminary article to the Criminal Procedure Code, measures infringing on a person’s privacy may be taken by or under the effective control of judicial authority but only if, in light of the circumstances of the case, they are needed in order to ascertain the truth and proportionate to the gravity of the offence charged.

36. It follows that the above-mentioned provisions, taken together, can be interpreted in a way that complies with EU law by allowing the expedited retention of stored connection data, even data retained for the purpose of safeguarding national security, in order to combat serious crime with a view to shedding light on a specified offence.

37. It is the responsibility of the court hearing such a plea to ascertain, first, whether the factual elements justifying the need for such an investigative measure meet the criterion of serious crime, assessed in accordance with national law, and second,whether the expedited retention of traffic and location data and access to that data is limited to what is strictly necessary.

38. With regard to the seriousness of the criminal acts being investigated, it is the judge’s responsibility to justify his or her decision in light of the nature of the behaviour of the person charged, the magnitude of the resulting harm, the circumstances regarding the commission of the acts and the length of the sentence incurred.

On access to the data

On EU requirements regarding access to the data

39. The CJEU has ruled (CJEU, judgment of 2 March 2021, H.K./Prokuratuur, C-746/18) that access to connection data may be authorised only if:

- that data has been retained in accordance with the requirements in EU law;

- it is conducted for the purpose that justified the retention or a more serious purpose, except in cases of expedited retention;

- it is limited to what is strictly necessary;

- with regard to traffic and location data, it is confined to procedures and proceedings to combat serious crime;

- and it is subject to a prior review carried out by either a court or an independent administrative authority.

On the requirement of a prior review

40. It follows from CJEU case-law that Article 15, paragraph 1 of Directive 2002/58/EC, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11, and Article 52, paragraph 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, precludes any national legislation giving the public prosecutor's office, which directs the criminal investigation procedure and, if necessary, prosecutes the offence, the power to authorise access by a public authority to traffic and location data (CJEU, H.K./Prokuratuur judgment, supra). CJEU case-law also holds that a police officer is not a court and does not offer all the required guarantees of acting objectively and impartially (CJEU, Commissioner of An Garda Siochana judgment, supra).

41. The CJEU reiterates that it is essential that any access to retained data by the competent national authorities be subject to a prior review conducted either by a court or by an independent administrative authority that is capable of striking a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interests relating to the needs of the investigation in the context of combating crime and, on the other, the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data.

42. Thus, Articles 60-1, 60-2, 77-1-1 and 77-1-2 of the Criminal Procedure Code are contrary to EU law only insofar as they do not provide for a prior review by a court or independent administrative authority.

43. The investigating judge is, however, authorised to review access to the connection data. That judge is not a party to the proceeding but a court, ruling specifically on petitions by the parties that specific investigative actions be taken, with those parties having remedies if their petition is refused; moreover, the judge does not bring the public prosecution] but rules impartially on the fate of the prosecution, set into motion by the prosecutor’s office or, as applicable, the civil party.

On the consequences of disregarding the requirements in EU law

44. The CJEU has ruled that it is for the national legal order of each Member State to establish, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, procedural rules for actions intended to safeguard the rights that individuals derive from EU law, provided, however, that those rules are no less favourable than the rules governing similar domestic actions – the principle of equivalence – and do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law – the principle of effectiveness (CJEU, La Quadrature du Net judgment, supra, point 223).

45. The principle of effectiveness requires national criminal courts to disregard information and evidence obtained by means of the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data in breach of EU law, or by a means of accessing that data that infringes on EU law, in the context of criminal proceedings against persons suspected of having committed criminal offences, where those persons are not in a position to comment effectively on that information and that evidence, since they pertain to a field of which the judges have no knowledge and are likely to have a preponderant influence on the findings of fact (CJEU, La Quadrature du Net judgment, supra, points 226 and 227).

46. In this regard, it follows from Articles 156 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code that any person who is charged may request an expert opinion from the investigating judge and, as applicable, a second expert opinion, under the oversight of the investigating chamber, when questions of a technical nature are raised. The same holds true before the trial court.

47. It follows that French law offers any person who is charged or prosecuted the ability to effectively dispute the relevance of evidence resulting from the use of connection data.

48. The principle of equivalence requires that all national procedural rules apply equally to actions based on infringement of EU law and to actions based on infringement of national law with a similar object and cause of action.

49. Except in cases of absolute nullity, which involve the proper administration of justice, whenever a petition or plea for the suppression of evidence or annulment of investigative acts   is brought before a court, that court must first determine whether the claimant has an interest in requesting the relief sought, then whether he or she has standing to do so, and lastly whether he or she has suffered harm as a result of the alleged irregularity. To determine whether the claimant has standing to bring an action for nullity, the court must examine whether the substantial formality or formality prescribed by law under penalty of nullity that has allegedly been infringed is intended to preserve a right or interest held by that claimant (Crim., 7 September 2021, appeal no 21-80.642, published in the Bulletin).

50. EU requirements on the storage and access to connection data are intended to protect the right to privacy, the right to the protection of personal data and the right to freedom of expression (CJEU, La Quadrature du Net judgment, supra), so that any breach of those requirements affects only a private interest.

51. This is specifically true for the requirement of a prior review by a court or independent administrative authority that is designed, in practice, to ensure full compliance with the conditions for accessing personal data, as indicated in paragraph 39, and in particular that any interference in the exercise of the above-mentioned rights is limited to what is strictly necessary (CJEU, H.K./Prokuratuur judgment, supra, points 51 and 51; CJEU, Commissioner of An Garda Siochana, supra, point 110).

52. It follows that pursuant to the principle of equivalence, the person who is charged or prosecuted may only invoke an infringement of this requirement with regard to access to connection data if he or she claims to be the holder or user of one of the identified lines or establishes that the investigations in question would have infringed his or her privacy (Crim., 6 February 2018, appeal No. 17-84.380, Bull. crim. 2018, No. 30).

53. Lastly, the criminal judge may only suppress evidence or annul part of the investigation  pursuant to the provisions of Article 802 of the Criminal Procedure Code, if the irregularity itself caused harm to the claimant, with proviso that said harm cannot result solely from the fact that incriminating evidence was found being charged with the act at issue (Crim., 7 September 2021, supra).

54. The Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) rules that the irregularity necessarily causes harm to the claimant when disregard of the rule has irrevocably affected that claimant’s rights.

55. Such is the case when an act that infringes on privacy has been carried out by an authority lacking jurisdictio , unless it has been lawfully authorised to do so. Such is also the case when the act has not been justified by the authority with jurisdiction to order the act, when such justification was required (Crim., 8 July 2015, appeal No. 15-81.731, Bull. crim. 2015, No. 174).

56. Otherwise, it is the claimant’s responsibility to show evidence of harm to his or her interests. The Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) holds that this is specifically true when the act infringing on privacy has been carried out by a competent agent but without third-party oversight when such oversight is required by law (Crim., 7 December 2021, appeal No. 20-82.733, published in the Bulletin). One example is a public prosecutor or police officer who has jurisdiction under French law to access connection data, but who acts without the prior review of a court or independent administrative authority.

57. It follows from the principles set forth in paragraphs 50 and 51 above that this lack of a prior, independent review can only cause harm to the claimant if the latter establishes that there was unjustified interference in his or her privacy or personal data, such that said access should have been prohibited.

58. It is therefore the investigating chamber’s responsibility to verify compliance with the four conditions listed in paragraph 39 and, specifically, to verify that the access involved duly retained data and that the type(s) of data involved, and the duration of access to that data, were – given the circumstances of the case – limited to what was strictly justified by the requirements of the investigation.

59. In this case, in order to dismiss the request for the suppression of evidence arising from the methods used to retain and access the connection data relating to Mr [L] [E], the investigating chamber states that the investigators made use of the latter’s telephone lines after those lines were identified from an examination of the terminal data flows covering the relevant locations for the investigation, namely the crime scene at [Location 2] at the time of the murder, the scene of the fire of the Mercedes vehicle belonging to the perpetrators at [Location 1] and the area of residence of the victim, [D] [P], at [Location 3], where the vehicle used by the killers was repeatedly located.

60. The investigating chamber notes that obtaining and using that data made it possible to locate the person of interest near places where [D] [P] was located, to conclude that the person of interest was surveiling [D] [P] and to determine that the latter was still in the area around his residence shortly before his murder, such that the person of interest could have given a starting signal to another individual to come join him at the spot where the victim was beaten a short time later.

61. The investigating chamber adds that Mr [L] [E], who was charged on 26 June 2020, has had access to the proceedings since that date and therefore, since that time, has been in a position to effectively comment on any aspect of the proceeding that constituted weighty and corroborative evidence making it likely that he was involved as perpetrator or accomplice in the acts.

62. It concludes that the alleged interference in Mr [L] [E]’s privacy from the investigators’ having requisitioned data from the telephone operators is allowed by law; that it had a legitimate purpose, which was to identify criminal offences that qualify as serious crime, in this case murder and attempted murder by an organised group, destruction by dangerous means by an organised group, criminal association, and concealment by an organised group; and that said objective of identifying criminal offences is necessary in a democratic society, and that said interference appears proportionate to the pursuit of that objective.

63. In stating the reasons above, from which it follows that the access to the information in question involved duly retained data and that said access occurred for the purpose of prosecuting offences that quality as serious crime, under conditions in which said access was limited to what was strictly justified by the requirements of the investigation, the investigating chamber did not disregard any of the legal provisions cited in the plea.

64. That plea must therefore be dismissed.

65. Furthermore, the ruling is procedurally regular.

 

ON THESE GROUNDS, the Court:

DISMISSES the appeal;